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ABSTRACT 
COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS AND THE UNFORGIVABLE 
By 
Robert Woon Chul Fisher 
University of New Hampshire, May 2009 
Forgiveness is an intricate part of our everyday moral interactions, although it is 
fundamentally a difficult concept. Unforgivable crimes are inexcusable, and equally as 
difficult a concept, because the unforgivable often references collective crimes. This 
paper will provide an analysis of forgiveness, the unforgivable, and how both relate to 
collectives by distinguishing the crimes from their perpetrators. At a fundamental level, 
individual forgiveness can be expanded to allow for collective forgiveness, despite the 
inherent difficulties of such collective forgiveness. Similarly, unforgivable crimes can be 
expanded to accommodate collective injuries. To accommodate for the unforgivable, I 
distinguished an unforgivable act from an unforgivable offender, and these ideas of 
unforgivability can also be expanded to collectives, and indeed such collective injuries 
are most often cited as examples of the unforgivable. 
v 
INTRODUCTION 
God has seen two World Wars in this century alone plus the Holocaust, the 
genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda, the awfulness in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, the 
two Congos, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, and the excesses that have 
characterized Latin American. It is a baneful catalog that records our capacity to 
wreak considerable harm on one another and our gross inhumanity to our fellow 
humans. 
- Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness' 
The horrendous crimes cataloged by Desmond Tutu are intuitively beyond the 
possibility of forgiveness, because they invoke Kant's notion of "the radical evil of 
human nature which ... constitutes the fouls strain of our species - and so long as we do 
not remove it, it hinders the germ of the good from developing as it otherwise would." 
The conception of radical evil is adopted by Hannah Arendt as "neither punishable nor 
forgivable, because punishment and forgiveness presuppose what radical evil eliminates: 
that is, human action."3 Jacques Derrida also believes that such massive injustices are 
unforgivable: "monstrous crimes ... [are] 'unforgivable."4 However, Derrida's 
interpretation of forgiveness is paradoxical, because "if there is something to forgive, it 
1
 Desmond Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 124. 
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. Allen Wood and George di 
Giovanni, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 61, Royal Prussian Academy of Science 
Pagination 6:38. 
3
 Richard J Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1996), 149. 
Jacques Derrida, "On Forgiveness," from On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (New York: Routledge, 
2001), 33. 
1 
would be in religious language is called mortal sin, the worst, the unforgivable crime or 
harm.... Forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable."5 Despite the many differences and 
disagreements between Arendt's and Derrida's discussions of the unforgivable, both are 
underlined by the massive scale of the injustices, not to mention the vagueness with 
which the unforgivable is discussed. This paper will address such collective crimes to 
determine whether they are unforgivable. I will provide an account of forgiveness that 
accommodates the unforgivable for both individuals and collectives by addressing the 
relation between the collectives that commit such crimes, the crimes themselves, and 
forgiveness. I will argue some crimes cannot be forgiven, and in some instances the 
groups that commit such crimes cannot be distinguished from the injuries, thus making 
the group unforgivable. However, individuals within collectives that are unforgivable 
may be forgiven, even if the collective as a whole cannot, because forgiving the injuries 
suffered can be distinguished from forgiving the offenders. I do not presuppose that the 
following is a complete account of forgiveness, or the unforgivable. Instead, I am 
attempting to demonstrate how forgiveness and the unforgivable can remain consistent 
when applied to individuals and collectives. 
5
 Derrida, "On Forgiveness," 32. 
CHAPTER I 
FORGIVENESS 
It is important to begin with a discussion of what is meant by "forgiveness," 
because our conceptions of forgiveness are muddied by its many uses. For example, we 
forgive our peers and ourselves for the minor offenses we commit against each other; we 
forgive debts; we forgive the dead, and many of us pray for God's6 forgiveness. 
Forgiveness is further confused by its similarities and relations to our conceptions of 
punishment, pardon, and mercy. The different uses of forgiveness are contextually 
dependent, and given the variety of the contexts in which forgiveness is appropriate, can 
have vastly different meanings. However, all forms of forgiveness are predicated on the 
assumption that there was, or at least is perceived to have been, an injury, crime, immoral 
act, sin, etc, committed. These notions of wrongdoing are widely varied, and for the sake 
of simplicity, will generally be referred to as "injuries" or "offenses." Also, forgiveness 
is generally "a certain kind of ethical response to injury and the injurer"7 that is primarily 
aimed at the reconciliation between the victim and the offender. By no stretch of the 
imagination do I suppose that the following analysis is a completely encompassing and 
6
 See Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) for a detailed 
account of the relationship between forgiveness and Judeo-Christian traditions. 
7
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 39. 
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authoritative account of forgiveness. However, what follows can generally be referred to 
as forgiveness at its best, or an ideal interpretation of forgiveness. 
The many uses and interpretations of an ideal forgiveness traditionally require the 
offender to feel remorseful, and to repent by "approaching the victim to apologize and 
ask for forgiveness."8 Continuing in this vein, I will argue the offender's remorse is an 
ideal condition for forgiveness, although forgiveness may still be achieved without an 
apology. Although apologies can have different meanings and may be offered in many 
different forms,9 it is the victim's responsibility to judge the offender's apologetic 
sincerity, and the truthfulness of the offender's remorse.10 For our purposes, "to be 
appropriately forgiven, the wrongdoer must morally regret the wrong he did to the other, 
and feel remorse," ' because this allows for a moral dialog between the parties. I believe 
an offender who is not remorseful for the injuries she occasioned is unworthy of 
forgiveness, despite the instances where the regret cannot be demonstrated to the 
victim, because forgiveness is a moral exchange between the victim and the offender 
that is aimed at reconciliation. Forgiveness can be interpreted as a deontological duty if 
the offender expresses appropriate remorse for the injuries. Forgiveness also promotes 
the end of reconciliation. 
Trudy Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," from American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 
1, (Jan. 1999), pp. 59-75, (University of Illinois Press), 59. 
9
 See Nick Smith, / Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
10
 Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 62. 
11
 Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 63. 
12
 Apologies are not always necessary for forgiveness, such as forgiving the dead. However, I believe 
forgiveness is best achieved when the offender acknowledges her guilt and remorse. 
4 
My account of an ideal forgiveness, and its aim of reconciliation, requires an 
apology from the offender, because apologies recognize the moral standing of the 
1 -J 
victim. Apologies also allow for the dialog that is necessary for B to forgive A for the 
injuries A caused B to suffer. The dialog is important, because it allows for agreement on 
the nature of the injuries suffered. An agreement on the injuries is important to 
forgiveness, because it would be inappropriate if I forgave you for one perceived injury, 
whereas you apologized for another. Apologies allow the offender to accept blame for 
causing the injury, and acknowledge the blame to the victim. The moral dialog that is 
necessary for forgiveness is referred to by Charles Griswold as the "narrative"14 of 
forgiveness: 
The narrative characterizes what is happening or happened; in so doing it reshapes 
it, or remembers it, or re-imagines it, but does not thereby fabricate it out of thin 
air. So narrative here claims to represent, in some sense, how things are (or 
were), what happened, and why - not just causally "why" but why from the 
perspective of the agent.15 
The dialogical nature of the narrative between the victim and her offender is important, 
because it recognizes the moral dignity of both parties, as well as remembers the injuries. 
However, the narrative itself does not constitute forgiveness. Instead, it is a necessary 
component of any morally significant forgiveness. The narrative acknowledges the 
agency of the offender, and her responsibility for causing the injuries. But if the narrative 
establishes the moral standing of the offender and the victim, as well as serves as an 
account of the injuries, yet does not constitute forgiveness, then what does forgiveness 
For a detailed account of the role of apologies see Smith, / was Wrong. 
14
 See Griswold, Forgiveness, 98-110. 
15
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 99. 
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entail? Bishop Butler believes forgiveness boils down to loving the offender, whereas 
"'love' is being understood here not so much as a feeling but as the recognition that even 
the most heinous human being is still' a sensible creature; that is, capable of happiness or 
misery."16 Repentance is important for an ideal forgiveness, because it initiates the moral 
interlocution. Forgiving without a remorseful apology raises motivational concerns for 
the victim, because "people who forgive too readily ... do not manifest the right degree 
of self-respect; they underestimate their own worth and fail to take their projects and 
entitlements seriously enough,"17 as well as devalue their own moral standing in the 
process. 
Conversely, the victim may require an apology in order to accept her offender "as 
1 8 
a morally worthy person capable of more than wrongdoing." If the victim demonizes 
her offender by only understanding her through the sufferings she caused, then 
forgiveness is impossible, because forgiveness requires a dialog between the parties. Or 
rather, the "recognition of shared humanity by the injured party is a necessary step on the 
way to forgiveness ... though it is not sufficient for it."19 It is this acknowledgement of 
the humanity of the other that I feel is important a dialogical forgiveness, because serious 
wrongs may prohibit the victim from understanding her offender as anything other than 
the source of her sufferings. If the offender is demonized in the eyes of the victim, then 
the distinction between the offense and the offender, which I will argue allows for the 
unforgivable, becomes blurred. Of course, there are forms of forgiveness that are not 
16
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 33. 
17
 David Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 
58, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 299-315, (International Phenomenological Society), 299. 
18
 Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 60. 
19
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 79. 
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dialogical, such as forgiving the dead, or forgiving an unspecified offender. However, 
the current discussion will only address such varieties of forgiveness briefly, because a 
victim cannot seek revenge against her offender if the offender is dead. Although much 
more can be said about the offender's remorse and the relationship of apologies to 
forgiveness, for the sake of brevity I conclude that an apologetic expression of remorse is 
an ideal condition for forgiveness, regardless of whether the victim forgives the offender, 
or its deontological standing. I will now begin to unpack what forgiveness entails. 
Many commentators have followed Bishop Butler's definition of forgiveness as 
the foreswearing of resentment.20 Butler defines resentment by distinguishing it 
"between two species: the first is 'hasty and sudden' anger; the second is 'settled anger,' 
which turns out to be 'deliberate resentment, malice, and revenge.'"21 Although some 
offenses may not involve resentment, "we recognize, albeit tacitly, that it is always 
possible that others will see these wrongs differently, take umbrage, or feel resentful."22 
So at the very least, forgiveness requires that there has been an injury, however 
insignificant. Minor offenses often do not engender "hard feelings of anger and 
resentment consequent on the wrong; hence no need to banish these feelings through 
forgiveness." The forgiveness associated with minor offenses can easily be attained, 
because such forgiveness does not challenge the victim to overcome and forswear her 
resentment. If forgiveness could always be attained as easily as the forgiveness 
See Griswold, Forgiveness. 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 22. 
22
 Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," 301. 
23
 Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," 302. 
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associated with minor offenses such as stepping on someone else's toes, then it would 
similarly be morally insignificant. 
The forswearing of resentment in individual instances of forgiveness requires the 
victim not to respond to her anger by seeking revenge or reciprocating her "pain and 
misery." To be more precise, Butler "claims that forgiveness is the forswearing of 
revenge." Note how the forswearing of revenge cannot be applicable to non-dialogical 
forms of forgiveness, such as forgiving the dead. It is important to distinguish resentment 
and the desire for revenge, because the presence of resentment is also important for 
forgiveness. The victim of an offense could seek revenge in many different ways. 
Revenge vaguely encompasses any retaliation the victim embarks on herself against the 
offender, but does not exclude any retributive justice the victim may wish to claim in 
response to her injuries. For example, the victim may require her offender to be punished 
by a court of law before she is willing to forgive. The Kantian principle of justice is 
based on "the principle of equality (in the position of the needle on the scale of justice), 
to incline no more to one side than to the other. Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil 
you inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon yourself."26 However, 
revenge may surpass the "eye for an eye" mentality that the punishment should fit the 
crime, because the victim may want her offender to suffer disproportionately. Retributive 
justice may be distinguished from revenge, because "forgiveness is [not] incompatible 
with punishment."27 For example, I could refuse to forgive a friend for crushing my foot 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 31. 
25
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 20. 
26
 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by Mary Gregor, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 105, Royal Prussian Academy of Science Pagination 6:332. 
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with her car when drunk until after she had been punished by a third party, presumably a 
court of law. Conversely, I could refuse to forgive my friend at all, and instead seek 
disproportional revenge by trying to inflict similar physical pains, and also seeking to 
inflict additional mental and emotional anguish. Although such vengefulness is not 
morally legitimized by the original injury, it is worth noting that any vengeful retaliation 
can be subsumed under the notion of revenge that forgiveness forswears. 
Revenge is forsworn because it is the reciprocation of a moral offense, and thus 
another moral offense, regardless of the victim's justification. For example, if a rape 
victim were so emotionally distraught that she sought revenge against her attacker by 
killing him, then she is still guilty of murder, regardless of her motivations. Forgiveness, 
on the other hand, counters a moral offense with a promise not to seek revenge. 
Although this does not right the wrong caused by the original offense, that the desire to 
seek revenge is forsworn is morally praiseworthy, because the offender remains a moral 
agent. That is, forgiveness is morally praiseworthy, because of the moral respect it grants 
the offender, despite her offenses. When we forgive, we forgive our offenders, but we do 
not condone their offenses. In this way, revenge and retaliation are acts that are in 
response to another act. They need to be directed at the offender as a person, but at her as 
the cause of the injuries. It is important to distinguish revenge as retaliation against a 
deed, and revenge against the person for the discussion of the unforgivable. Similarly, 
forgiveness forswears revenge against either the injury, the offender, or both. 
The role of resentment in forgiveness is more muddied than that of revenge, 
because resentment must be expanded to include other negative emotions and reactions to 
Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 60. 
9 
the crimes, such as contempt or sadness, which do not simply disappear when the 
victim forgives her offender. Instead, "the serious wrongs that require our forgiveness 
cannot be morally condoned, and their pardon, if secured, will only involve the 
renouncement of our claims against the wrongdoer but will not straightforwardly result in 
the abandonment of the bitter feelings that these wrongs have occasioned."29 Resentment 
is important for forgiveness, because "to forgive is not to forget the wrongs we have 
suffered but rather to regard their perpetrators, and the wrongs themselves, in the moral 
light of acceptance and compassion rather than in the glare of resentment and hatred."30 
Forswearing resentment allows the victim to overcome the emotional and psychological 
damages the injuries occasioned. Resentment must also be forsworn to understand the 
offender as a moral interlocutor who is worthy of moral respect, and not merely 
demonized by the lingering resentment. Also, the forswearing of resentment may be 
psychologically and emotionally beneficial to the victim; it allows forgiveness to be 
understood as more than the morally beneficial absolution of the offender's crimes. But 
not all resentment is demonizing, nor does it necessitate that the offender is interpreted as 
a "moral monster."31 Forgiveness requires that resentment is forsworn if the resentment 
causes the victim to demonize her offender, and if the resentment is be psychologically 
and emotionally detrimental to the victim's well-being. Thus forswearing revenge can be 
beneficial to the victim, especially in instances where revenge is impossible, such as 
forgiving the dead. 
28
 See Norvin Richards, "Forgiveness," from Ethics, Vol. 99, No. 1 (Oct., 1988), pp. 77-97 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press), 79. 
29
 Novitz, "Forgiveness and Self-Respect," 301. 
30
 Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 60. 
31
 See Griswold, Forgiveness, 73-7. 
10 
However, the challenge of forswearing resentment may pose many difficulties for 
the victim,32 because the resentment may not be initially apparent, and the victim may not 
feel any negative emotions towards her offenders until well after the injuries have 
occurred. Once an injury has been forgiven, the victim may regain her resentfulness 
years later. The victim may be incapable of completely overcoming her resentment. The 
lingering resentment depends on the nature of the injury. For example, if I resent a close 
friend for damaging and forgetting to return a valued book, then the value of our 
continued friendship may allow me to forgive her, and the resentment may dissipate with 
time. However, if this friend intentionally set fire to my home, then our friendship will 
become strained, if it is not ended. Furthermore, I may continue to resent her for such 
irreparable malice, and wish to inflict a similar misfortune. However, I may still forgive 
this friend when I promise not to seek retribution for the injuries suffered. Furthermore, 
my resentment need not demoralize or dehumanize my friend, because of the history of 
our friendship. Instead, I would be able to engage in the moral dialog of forgiveness with 
my former friend, despite my resentment. On the other hand, my resentment may be 
necessary for my desire to seek revenge for the injuries suffered, and thus resentment is 
necessary for forgiveness. Although the resentment may linger, resentment is necessary 
for forgiveness, because resentment encompasses revenge. That is, without feeling 
resentment, the victim would lack a desire to seek revenge, remembering that revenge 
can be distinguished from punishment or retributive justice, because the desire for 
revenge may be subsumed under resentment. However, once forgiveness has been 
achieved, resentment is no longer a necessary condition. That is, the moral value of the 
Richards, "Forgiveness," 77. 
11 
achievement of forgiveness does not speak to whether or not the victim retains her 
resentment. At the very least, the retention of resentment is dependent on the nature of 
the forgiveness and the injuries, and thus resentment cannot be categorically supposed to 
last after the injuries have been forgiven. 
The indefinite nature of the victim's negative emotions and resentment does not 
imply that the act of forgiving is similarly indefinite. If forgiveness is indefinite, then 
inaction would constitute forgiveness: the absence of retaliation does not imply that the 
victim has forgiven her offender. The silent harboring of resentment, which does not lead 
to retaliation, does not mean that the offender has been forgiven.33 Also, it is worth 
noting that memory is important to forgiveness, forgetting could be mistaken as the 
forswearing of revenge, and thus forgiveness. However, forgiveness is not a passive act, 
and "remembrance itself... can to some extent repair the past wrongs and express respect 
for the victims."3 Instead, I believe that forgiveness is a definite moral act that is worthy 
of moral appraisal, and that it is not a moral virtue,35 nor can it be achieved by passively 
forgetting the injuries. The victim must perform a definitive act of forgiveness by 
forswearing revenge and resentment. Although retribution and revenge may be morally 
blameworthy, the blame is intensified if they occur after forgiveness has been achieved. 
The satisfaction or expression of anger and resentment through revenge is 
incompatible with forgiveness, because any ensuing forgiveness would seem insincere, if 
not inappropriate. Forgiveness and revenge are mutually exclusive, but forgiveness is not 
33
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 31. 
34
 Jeffrey Blustein, The Moral Demands of Memory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 21. 
35
 Although a detailed account of these differing interpretations of forgiveness would be appropriate, they 
will merely be acknowledged for the sake of brevity. For a comprehensive discussion of these differing 
interpretations, see Griswold, Forgiveness, pp. 1-89. 
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binary; it is not the case that forgiveness is either granted or it is not. There are many 
other ways a victim could react to her injuries that do not involve retribution or 
forgiveness, and refusing to seek revenge is not the same as forgiving the offender. 
Revenge, on the other hand, need not be enacted by the victim. Instead, she may allow a 
third party, such as the judicial system, to punish her offender. Forgiveness and revenge 
can be distinguished from third party punishment,37 "especially where the injured party is 
no longer capable of responding to the offender, those intimately affected often assume 
they have a right to forgive or to refuse to forgive."38 Individual forgiveness can be 
achieved even if the offender has been punished by a third party. 
36
 Forgiveness and revenge are distinguished from "the administration of justice," see Griswold, 
Forgiveness, 32. 
37
 See Smith, / Was Wrong, 135. 
38
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 117. 
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CHAPTER II 
INDIVIDUAL FORGIVENESS AND THE UNFORGIVABLE 
The previous chapter outlined some of the ideal conditions for forgiveness as it 
applies to individuals. I will now turn to a discussion of the unforgivable. It is important 
to note that a majority of the philosophical literature on forgiveness denies the possibility 
of some crimes being completely beyond the possibility of forgiveness. Those that 
accept the unforgivable, namely Arendt and Derrida, are hopelessly vague in their 
discussions. In order to try to unpack a notion of the unforgivable, I will distinguish the 
crimes from their source; the offender. So although an offender may never be completely 
beyond the realm of forgiveness, the injuries she occasioned may be unforgivable. 
However, following Griswold, "I cannot assert or deny, in the abstract, that every wrong-
doer is in practice forgivable" because "it is possible - indeed it is the case - that some 
offenders turn out to be incapable of remorse, choice, and moral transformation."3 If 
forgiveness requires a remorseful apology from the offender, then it would seem that 
those incapable of remorse are unforgivable. But this raises questions concerning the 
sincerity of the remorse, the nature of the injuries that could prohibit regret, the moral 
agency of the unremorseful, and any psychological conditions that may prohibit remorse, 
among others. Furthermore, the victim may refuse to accept the apology, regardless of 
the sincerity of the remorse. So it would be a great undertaking to assess the 
39
 Griswold, Forgiveness, 94, 93. 
14 
unforgivable solely in light of the requirement that the offender express her regret for 
forgiveness, especially since apologetic remorse is debated as a requirement for 
forgiveness. 
It could assumed that if forgiveness requires the forswearing of revenge and 
resentment, then a crime that is beyond the possibility of forgiveness would be beyond 
the possibility of forswearing revenge and resentment. However, the unforgivable cannot 
require the victim to seek revenge, because it would be a mistake to understand the 
unforgivable as requiring the continuation of offenses. That is, it would be inappropriate 
for a moral system to include a requirement for offenses to be perpetuated indefinitely. 
And although this could be what Arendt meant by saying that radical evil is beyond the 
possibility of forgiveness or punishment,40 it also seems that the unforgivable can be 
punished. For example, if murder is an unforgivable offense, then it would be a mistake 
to think of murderers as beyond the possibility of punishment or retributive justice. 
Beyond the forswearing of revenge, forgiveness also requires the forswearing of 
resentment, but only if the injuries caused such resentment that the victim demonizes her 
offender. Such demonization prohibits the moral interlocution for forgiveness. But if the 
injuries are beyond the possibility of forgiveness, then it would be appropriate if the 
offender is demonized, because the offender would be inseparably tied to the evilness of 
her crimes. There are certainly injuries, such as rape and murder that elicit immense 
resentment. However, the resentment associated with such crimes may still be forsworn, 
and the victims41 may still forgive. Forgiving such violent crimes might only occur after 
Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, 137-50. 
15 
the offender has been punished. For example, a convicted murderer may be remorseful 
and forgiven by the families of his victims. But just because the murderer is forgiven 
does not mean that murder is a forgivable crime. Deontological accounts of forgiveness 
never excuse murder, because it is inherently wrong to take another's life, although 
forgiving the murderer might be allowed for any number of reasons. For example, killing 
in self defense is still taking the life of another, but the attacked can be excused if the 
attacker was unprovoked, and the victim's life was unquestionably threatened. My 
account of the unforgivable requires a distinction between the offender and the offense. 
This line of argument would raise the concern that any offense is unforgivable, because 
of its offensive nature. That is, we cannot forgive any act, although we may forgive the 
actor. But this line of thinking is only inappropriate if forgiveness forgives both the 
offender and the offense she occasioned, because although we may never condone certain 
acts, we often forgive their actors. This brings us to the distinction between the 
unforgivable injuries, and an unforgivable offender. 
In unpacking the unforgivable, it is important to note that Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu "insisted that though their deeds were monstrous, human beings should never be 
described as monsters, [and] he expressed a long tradition of Christian thought 
emphasizing that the sinner should be separated from the sin."42 A secular account would 
distinguish agents from their actions, and allow for an account of both unforgivable 
crimes, and unforgivable agents. If the offender is understood as separate and distinct 
from the injuries she caused, and not as a moral monster, then she may be forgiven, 
41
 Murder victims obviously are not in any position to forgive their offenders. However, secondary victims, 
such as the deceased's family, could forgive the murderer. See Piers Benn, "Forgiveness and Loyalty," 
from Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 277, (July 1996), pp. 369-383. 
42
 Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 65. 
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because "forgiveness is something we extend or do not extend towards persons, and it 
fundamentally affects the relationships between persons. And yet, it is deeds which are 
said to be unforgivable."43 For example, rape, torture, and murder are often cited as 
unforgivable acts, because they are so repulsive and heinous. Intuitively, we would not 
require an analysis of why such crimes are unforgivable. For the sake of argument, 
however, it could be asked whether or not such crimes could be forgiven. The offender 
may be forgiven for the victim's "peace of mind" and ability to overcome the trauma she 
suffered, but are the crimes themselves forgivable? For example, we may forgive a 
murderer, but we would never condone such malicious killing. So it seems to me that the 
answer would have to be negative, although this is clearly debatable. The fact that we 
can never condone such malicious acts is sufficient justification for their unforgivability, 
even though we may forgive the perpetrators. This represents a disconnect within 
forgiveness: we endorse forgiveness as morally praiseworthy, but we never endorse the 
crimes being forgiven. Instead, we only support that the offender is forgiven. 
This would appear to lead to the contradiction, because if all offenses can never 
be condoned, then all offenses are unforgivable, but forgiving the offenders is endorsed. 
There are some offenses that might have dire moral consequences, such as forgetting to 
drive a sick friend to a scheduled doctor's appointment, that are forgivable in principle. I 
may be forgiven for my forgetfulness, because we have all forgotten to fulfill important 
promises at some point, and the outcome of the offense can have dire consequences. So 
it need not be the case that all offenses that cannot be condoned are themselves 
unforgivable. However, it is rarely the case that we forgive the injuries we suffer, but not 
our offenders. For example, I may forgive a friend for forgetting to pick me up at the 
Govier, "Forgiveness and the Unforgivable," 65. 
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airport, thus causing me to miss an important event, say a funeral. But in so doing, I am 
excusing my friend, but I am not forgiving her forgetfulness itself. This is not to say that 
we ignore the injuries we suffered when we forgive our offenders, or that we never 
forgive the injuries themselves. But whenever we do forgive an offense, we usually 
forgive the offender as well. Forgiveness typically includes both the crime and the 
offender, but some injuries may be so profound that is humanly impossible44 to forgive 
either the crime itself, the offender, or both. 
It should be noted that the previous example does not intuitively qualify as an 
unforgivable offense. Instead, my unwillingness to forgive my friend does not mean that 
she is unforgivable, merely unforgiven. It is important to distinguish the unforgivable 
from the unforgiven. The unforgiven is simply an offense that has not been forgiven by 
the victim. Although the offense may be morally blameworthy if the offender has 
expressed remorse and offered to make amends for the sufferings she caused, the 
offender is not beyond the possibility of forgiveness. The unforgivable, on the other 
hand, cannot be forgiven. But the unforgivable does not imply that the offender cannot 
be forgiven, unless the offender is incapable of being distinguished from her offenses. 
Instead, it means that a particular injury cannot be forgiven, but unless the offender is 
reduced to her offenses, then the offender may still be forgiven. 
So why are some injuries beyond the possibility of forgiveness? If it is 
impossible to understand the offender as a moral interlocutor, presumably because of the 
severity of her offenses, then forgiveness becomes impossible. That is, one cannot offer 
a moral forgiveness to a non-moral entity. This may seem odd, and raises questions 
concerning forgiving the dead, who are no longer moral agents, or forgiveness in general. 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 94. 
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Forgiving the dead is interesting, because as stated above, I believe that remorse is 
essential for an ideal forgiveness, and the dead clearly cannot express remorse to their 
victims. But I do not wish to rule out the possibility of forgiving the dead, because such 
forgiveness clearly has psychological implications for the victims. But the psychology of 
such forgiveness is very ends-oriented, and does not necessitate deontological 
forgiveness. Even if there is a moral duty to forgive the dead, then the forgiveness is not 
directed at a moral agent, but instead at the moral importance of the memory of the 
deceased. That is, the dead are not beyond the possibility of forgiveness, because to 
forgive the dead is more directly tied to the victim's well being, and not the moral 
interlocution of forgiveness. 
So how is an offender reduced to a non-moral entity that is beyond the possibility 
of forgiveness? Such dehumanization is the result of the immense resentment the 
offender has caused. If the offender cannot be understood as separate and distinct from 
the sufferings she caused, then she may be understood as beyond the possibility of 
forgiveness. The demonization of the offender cannot be subjectively determined by the 
victim alone, but by the moral community. The moral community does not imply the 
legal system as a third party, because such unforgivable offenses are not beyond the 
possibility of punishment. This goes against Arendt's conception of radical evil and the 
unforgivable as being beyond the possibility of forgiveness or punishment. 
This is not to say that notorious individuals such as Hitler are forgivable. 
However, Hitler is indistinguishable from the Holocaust, which is beyond the possibility 
of forgiveness. "Nonetheless it would be true that a person who is in principle 
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unforgivable warrants resentment forever." Thus, resentment would be tied to the 
unforgivable more so than the forgivable. But imagine a murderer getting away with 
killing, and never being accused of the crime, thereby not invoking any resentment. 
Furthermore, imagine that her victim did not have any close friends or family, and lived 
in obscurity, thus leaving no survivors to mourn her death, let alone resent the murderer. 
If murder is unforgivable, then it would seem that this particular murderer is not exempt 
simply because of the circumstances of her crime. But how are such deeds unforgivable, 
and can the unforgivable truly be distinct from the offenders who are the sources of such 
injuries? Forgiveness requires the forswearing of resentment only if the resentment 
dehumanizes the offender. The unforgivable is primarily concerned with those who have 
been demonized by their victims, and would not be distinct from the sufferings she 
caused. Although an individual offender may be unforgivable, the above discussion is 
purposefully complicated. I will now demonstrate how collective injuries are more easily 
understood as unforgivable. 




The defining characteristics of individual forgiveness in the previous chapters are 
primarily applicable to individuals, and pose difficulties for collective forgiveness. This 
chapter will address some of the inherent difficulties with collective forgiveness. The 
first of which is determining what constitutes a collective. A collective may be a random 
group of individuals, or a group "whose members have some property or properties in 
common and whose identity is something more than the aggregated identities of its 
individual members."46 A group may be identified as a collective by its members, or by 
an external group; the members of a collective need not identify with the group. Instead, 
the members of a collective can be identified as belonging to a particular collective by 
others: "the possession of common features by the members of a [collective] does not 
entail that the group has coherence as an entity in its own right and that its members are 
unified is some way.... They may not even be aware of each other's existence."47 
Collective forgiveness requires that the group has suffered similar injuries, because it 
would be useless to define a collective as unrelated individuals who have suffered 
46
 Blustein, The Moral Demands of Memory, 119. 
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unrelated injuries from completely different offenders. For our purposes, a collective is a 
group that has been identified as such, and has suffered at the hands of another group. 
However, the collective injuries are not necessarily the result of such identification. 
Not all collectives must be defined negatively by such characteristics, or 
identified because of its collective injuries. For example, doctors and lawyers are 
generally understood favorably, because of the prestige and honor associated with their 
positions. The positive classification of doctors and lawyers is applied to them as a 
collective, regardless of individual experiences with incompetent doctors or "greedy 
lawyers." In terms of collective forgiveness, however, it is often the case that negative 
characteristics are the defining features that allow such a group to be systematically 
discriminated against, or the justification for the injuries the group suffers. For example, 
the United States' history of racial discrimination shows how "historically, blacks were 
oppressed and discriminated against because they were black, in a legal-political order 
that assumed they deserved less than equal respect and consideration because of their 
race."48 African Americans were viewed collectively by their offenders, and 
discriminated against because of such collective identifications. 
It is important to note that the identification of a collective is often blurred. The 
discriminatory injuries suffered by African Americans shared the underlying theme of 
racial motivations, and can thus be understood as collective in nature, despite how each 
individual suffered separately. However, African Americans are a sub-collective of 
48
 McCarthy, "Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II," 753-4. 
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Americans, and their offenders also belong to the umbrella collective of Americans. 
The distinctions between the offenders and the victims have become so blurred that any 
forgiveness would seem impossible. Collective injuries are the crimes committed against 
the collective, and are composed of a multitude of individual injuries. However, the 
victims all suffered similarly because they had been collectively identified and targeted 
by their offenders. The Holocaust is an example where European Jews collectively 
suffered similar injuries because they had been collectively targeted by the Nazis. It is 
not the case that an individual's sufferings in the Holocaust were merely an instance of a 
single offender targeting a single victim. In this way, the overarching and 
indiscriminate50 nature of the Nazis' persecution of Jews can be understood as a 
collective injury. 
Collective injuries are not necessarily the sum of the individual injuries, although 
such may be the case. For example, American segregation is a collective injury that 
inevitably fails to catalog all instances of racially-justified and racially-motivated 
injuries, because countless injuries have been unrecorded and lost to the pages of time. 
The loss of such details does not prohibit collective forgiveness, although collective 
forgiveness for the entire history of American slavery, segregation, discrimination, and 
racism may be impossible to achieve, and will be argued to be unforgivable. Collective 
injuries create difficulties for understanding the role of the individual, because of their 
This does not include the European slave traders who also committed collective injuries. 
5
 I use "indiscriminate" here to refer to the unspecific nature of a given individual's injuries. Collective 
injuries are often motivated and justified by discrimination. 
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impersonal nature. Although a collective injury may be collectively forgiven, a member 
of the victimized collective may be unable to endorse the group's forgiveness. That is, 
there is a problem with consensus. This is not to imply that all collective forgiveness can 
be categorically rejected as conceptual and practical impossibilities. Instead, the size of a 
collective directly influences whether or not collective forgiveness is possible. But in 
theory, collective forgiveness remains possible, despite the practical difficulties of 
achieving reconciliation. To achieve collective forgiveness, the offenders would have to 
offer the collective a remorseful apology, and then the collective would have to forswear 
revenge against their offenders, as well as acknowledge their shared humanity. 
The achievement of collective forgiveness depends on the size of the collective. 
For example, if a rock and roll band uses offensive lyrics towards women in its songs, 
then the band as a whole is held responsible, not just the composer of the lyrics. The 
band could apologize to the public, promise to never perform the songs that include the 
offensive lyrics, make efforts to support women's rights, and subsequently be forgiven. 
Despite the oversimplification of this example, most notably the unspecified victims and 
the ease with which such forgiveness appears to have been achieved, it can be understood 
how small groups can also be viewed as collectives. Furthermore, collective forgiveness 
seems, at least on the surface, to be practically attainable for small groups. However, 
larger collectives, such as those affected by American slavery and the ensuing 
segregation, would clearly pose a greater difficulty. 
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Collective forgiveness resembles individual forgiveness, in that Collective B 
forgives Collective A for X injuries Collective A caused B to suffer. Similar to 
individual forgiveness, the offending collective would have to offer a remorseful apology 
in order to be forgiven. However, agreeing on the nature and extent of X creates 
problems for collective forgiveness. That is, collective forgiveness requires the 
Collective B to agree not to retaliate for the injuries they have suffered. A substantial 
difficulty of any attempt at collective forgiveness is the accommodation of the interests of 
the individuals within a collective. For example, each member of the collective 
presumably suffered the collective injuries differently, and thus the forgiveness would 
have different meanings to each individual. Some members may refuse to forgive their 
offenders; they need not all agree to forgive. Even if the collective can decide 
collectively not to retaliate for injuries x, y, and z, does not imply that the members agree 
on the nature of such injuries, or that the injuries in question are the only ones that are 
appropriate for the forgiveness. 
The difficulties of individual interests and collective agreement are compounded 
as the sizes of the collective increases. Another example could be a nation forswearing 
revenge against an offending neighbor by not going to war, and forgiving the neighboring 
nation for their trespasses. It is not expected that every member within the collective 
agree to such forgiveness, because of the inevitable difficulties of achieving a consensus. 
Indeed, some members of the victimized nation might desire violence and retribution for 
the injuries they have suffered. However, a collective can be a separate agent that is 
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distinct from its members. For example, the United States is a collective that is 
understood as an individual entity, not as the sum of its citizens. The policies and acts of 
the US are rarely endorsed or opposed by an overwhelming percentage of the population, 
and often times there is strong disagreement. The difficulty of achieving consensus is 
one of the primary difficulties in any discussion of collective forgiveness. Agreement 
becomes more problematic as the size of the collective, such as the United States, 
becomes larger. As with any collective, actions may be taken without a consensus, and 
such acts reflect on the collective as a whole. Furthermore, the collective's desire to seek 
revenge, or at least be resentful for the injuries, will inevitably lack a consensus. 
Agreement in a collective becomes more important when dealing with collective 
injuries. Although the collective forgives as a whole, single, unified agent, its members 
presumably suffered differently. For example, imagine the United States government 
offering a collective apology for its endorsement of the enslavement and the ensuing 
discrimination of Africans throughout its history. Attempting to exemplify such an 
apology seems impossible, because it is either too brief and does not adequately quantify 
the moral significance of the injuries, or it could be too long, making it unwieldy and 
causing many of the injuries to be "lost in the shuffle." However, as argued above, my 
interpretations of forgiveness require that the offenders offer sincere and remorseful 
apologies for the injuries they caused. Apologies are necessary for individual 
forgiveness, because they start the moral dialog about the nature of the injuries. 
Collective apologies serve the same purpose, but are complicated as collective 
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forgiveness. But even if an acceptable apology was to be offered, and the African 
American community was to collectively decide to accept it and forgive the US 
government, some members would have suffered differently. This is important, because 
of the tensions created between collective forgiveness, and the interests of its members. 
Non-dialogical forms of forgiveness (forgiving the dead) was mention briefly above, and 
but the difficulties of one-sided forgiveness is also compounded for collectives. 
Another difference between individual and collective forgiveness is the role of 
memory. Although it was only alluded to briefly above, individual forgiveness requires 
the memory of the injuries, so that the appropriate harms can be forgiven. However, the 
remembrance of the injuries is not necessary after they have been forgiven, although such 
remembrance could explain any lingering resentment. Large instances of collective 
forgiveness, on the other hand, require a different sort of remembrance of the injuries. 
Returning to the example of American history of endorsing racially based slavery and 
segregation, if such forgiveness could be achieved, it is not the case that every American 
citizen must remember the details of each and every injury subsumed under the collective 
injury. A collective is not the sum of its members, so it is not required that all members 
of the collective remember the injuries, and such remembrance would be impossible. 
Instead, the injuries are remembered through a generalized history, specifically the 
history of the collective. 
When nations or otherwise organized groups involving multiple individuals 
attempt to establish an agreement on the injuries suffered with another large group, the 
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inevitable disagreements could be insurmountable. Beyond the initial limitations of the 
countless unrecorded injuries suffered that could not be included, there are instances in 
which the offending parties refuse to participate in the dialog, or refuse to admit to 
committing such crimes. Such a refusal to participate in a dialog to establish a narrative 
could be interpreted as an instance in which the offenders are unwilling accept the moral 
standings of their victims, and thus may not allow the offenders to be fully forgiven. At 
the same time, a partially agreed-upon narrative and an unforgiving group of victims 
could further the animosity between the victims and the offenders. But even a partially 
agreed-upon narrative would accomplish the task of acknowledging the moral standing of 
both parties, because of the moral dialog necessary to agree on at least some of the 
injuries. In this sense, even if resentment is not forsworn and the victims' claims against 
their offenders are not disavowed, the moral standing of both groups would be 
recognized. The offenders' recognition of the morality of their victims could also 
acknowledge the wrongness of the injustices, and could indirectly promise that such 
crimes will not be repeated. Even if they do not forgive their offenders, this indirect 
promise may suffice for the victims. The collaboration on a narrative runs the risk that if 
important details are neglected or forgotten, then additional harms could result from such 
a loss of details. For example, it would seem that in reconciling with Germany after the 
Holocaust, additional harms would be created if the Auschwitz death camp were 
completely forgotten. In this sense, there seems to be a duty to remember such harms, 
and to fail to remember them is itself another injury. From here, it is important to 
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remember the distinction between collective identities, and how the collective remembers 
particular details, from individual memory and how individuals may suffer greater harms 
from the lack of such details. Just because a collectively agreed-upon narrative may not 
include some particular details does not imply that the individuals within the collectives 
would forget them, or that their particular sufferings can be accounted for as the 
collective forgiveness is then disseminated. That is, the individual details can be 
encompassed by the collective memory and forgiveness, and then acknowledged by the 
individuals themselves. 
The injuries that are necessary for individual forgiveness are required to cause the 
victim to resent her offender, because she cannot forswear revenge unless the revenge is 
motivated by resentment. However, the role of the resentment loses its importance after 
forgiveness has been achieved: whether or not the victim retains her resentment does not 
influence the forgiveness after it had been achieved. Collective forgiveness, on the other 
hand, need not require resentment at all. More specifically, the resentment need not be 
experienced by all members of the collective, or even the collective as a whole, because 
there could be other motivations for collective forgiveness that are not subsumed under 
resentment and revenge. That is, "both offenders and victims have reasons to overlook 
obstacles confronting collective [forgiveness]"51 that are dependent on the nature of the 
collective injuries, and the relationship between the parties. The many difficulties of 
achieving collective forgiveness are readily apparent,52 but do not imply that the 
51
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collective injuries are unforgivable. However, unforgivable injuries must be collective. 
The next chapter will discuss the collective nature of the unforgivable, and distinguish the 
unforgivable from the unforgiven. 
52
 See Smith, / Was Wrong, 157. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COLLECTIVE FORGIVENESS AND THE UNFORGIVABLE 
The previous chapters defined forgiveness, and showed some of the ways 
forgiveness is more difficult to achieve for collectives. The difficulties of some instances 
of collective forgiveness cause the injuries to remain unforgiven. I now will argue that 
the collective crimes cataloged by Tutu in the introduction are not merely unforgiven, but 
unforgivable. Similar to the difficulties of interpreting the unforgivable for individual 
injuries, collective injuries can be understood as distinct from the offensive collective. If 
a collective is defined by its offenses, then the group may be unforgivable, even though 
some of its members may be forgiven for their individual participation in the injuries. 
Although there are difficulties in separating the injury from the offender for individual 
forgiveness, the offender has a different moral relationship to the victim than the injury. 
If the crime can be distinguished from the offender, and if the moral community cannot 
endorse such injuries, then the crime may be unforgivable. A collective, on the other 
hand, may be defined by the injuries it inflicts. If a collective cannot be separate from the 
suffering it inflicts, and if such injuries are unforgivable, then the collective may be 
unforgivable as well. This clearly requires some greater explanation. 
I argued above that crimes are never condoned, even though the agents that cause 
such injuries may still be forgiven. The agent and her act are fundamentally distinct. If 
the injustice of the crime is granted, and if the agent cannot be distinguished from the 
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injustice, then the agent and the injustice would also be indistinguishable: the agent is 
unjust. A collective may be defined in many different ways, but in regard to collective 
forgiveness, the offending collective may be defined by its members' shared participation 
in the collective injuries. If a collective cannot be distinguished from the injuries it 
causes, and if such injuries are deemed unforgivable, then the collective may also be 
unforgivable. However, each individual member of the collective is not similarly 
unforgivable, because individuals may not be beyond the possibility of forgiveness. For 
example, the Ku Klux Klan is a militant white supremacist group that was formed out of 
racially unjust motives, and participated in the murder of countless African Americans. 
These murders are unforgivable, and the Klan is a collective that has been united by such 
violence, so the KKK can be interpreted as an unforgivable collective. 
A collective that has been defined by its unforgivable crimes may be beyond the 
possibility of punishment, but this is not to say that every individual member of the 
collective is similarly unforgivable. For example, the Nazis cannot be discussed without 
invoking World War II and the Holocaust. The Holocaust is the epitome of an 
unforgivable offense, and so the Nazis may be unforgivable because of their inseparable 
association with the Holocaust. However, not every member of the Nazi party must 
likewise be unforgivable. Several were coerced to join the Nazi party, and they opposed 
the persecution of the Jews. These individuals were nominally Nazis, but that is the 
extent of their association with the Holocaust, and thus they are not unforgivable. 
Conversely, Hitler is inseparable from either the Nazis or the Holocaust, and so he may 
be unforgivable. 
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The ability to forgive some members of an unforgivable collective cannot be 
reduced to the fact that all members of the collective can be forgiven, because such a 
reduction would imply a distinction between the collective and its members. Although 
such a reduction is not impossible, and depending on how the collective has been 
grouped, could be possible, this is not always the case. Just as there are difficulties in 
achieving collective forgiveness, because of the different roles each individual played in 
the injury, some individuals within a collective are inherently tied to the collective's 
crimes. For example, the president and/or CEO of a corporation may be held accountable 
for the company's actions, because her position is so closely related to the company that 
the individual cannot be divorced from his position. Similarly, many of the company's 
employees have little to no input concerning the company's affairs, and thus are separate 
and distinct from the company collective. Of course, if the collective is punished as a 
whole, or if its victims seek collective revenge against it, then all members might share 
equally in such retributive justice. 
The unforgivable is not merely beyond the possibility of forgiveness because it 
deals with collective crimes. Instead, the unforgivable is based on Hannah Arendt's 
notion of "radical evil." Arendt's description of "absolute evil" in the first edition of The 
Origins of Totalitarianism illustrates the unforgivable: "When the impossible was made 
possible it became the unpunishable, unforgivable absolute evil."53 The unforgivable 
must be beyond the possibility of punishment. However, the key members of the 
collective can surely be punished for their roles in the collective injuries. For example, 
the CEO could be indicted for authorizing her company's actions, but a legally 
sanctioned punishment of all members of the company is not applicable. 
5
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In Chapter I, I argued that a victim can still forgive her offender, even after the 
offender has been punished by a third party. Individual forgiveness allows for a 
distinction between punishment and revenge. Although collectives may have difficulty 
of designating a third party arbitrator as a moral authority to punish their offenders, 
punishment can also coexist with collective forgiveness, and is distinct from the 
forswearing of revenge. If the unforgivable is beyond the possibility of forgiveness and 
punishment, then revenge and punishment become similarly impossible. Because of this, 
the unforgivable does not require a distinction between revenge and punishment, because 
they are both impossible retaliations against the offenders. This means that an 
unforgivable collective injury cannot be forgiven by a third party. 
If a crime can be punished, then the punishment must fit the crime. This is not to 
say crimes that are neither punished nor forgiven are instances of the radical evil, as 
Arendt believes. One could argue that murder is unforgivable. However, according to 
Arendt, the unforgivable is beyond punishment and forgiveness. A murderer can be 
forgiven, and she most certainly may be punished. Such forms of punishment often 
include capital punishment, or life imprisonment, both of which represent the "eye for an 
eye" mentality that the punishment should fit the crime. 
Collective murders are beyond the possibility of punishment, because there is no 
punishment that would adequately fit the crime. In the case of American slavery and the 
ensuing segregation, there are no ways such injuries could be reciprocated or reflected in 
an appropriate punishment. Furthermore, the notions of offenders and victims are so 
blurred that the collective recipients of the punishment would be unwieldy and difficult to 
comprehend. But just because the punishment is beyond the realm of practicality does 
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not imply that the collective crimes, American slavery, are unforgivable. The notion of 
collective forgiveness, and its connection to the unforgivable will need to be unpacked 
further. Furthermore, it must be asked whether the notion of "beyond punishment" can 
be understood theoretically, if such punishment cannot possibly be realized. If 
punishment is beyond practicality, then the crime is unforgiven, but not necessarily 
unforgivable. It is conceivable that a small group of white extremists could be punished 
for their racially motivated collective crimes against a small group of African Americans. 
If the offenders are neither punished, nor forgiven, then their crimes remain unforgiven. 
However, as a sample of the large issue of racially motivated discrimination, their part of 
the overarching collective injuries cannot be forgiven; it is unforgivable. 
Collective injuries are unforgivable because they are dehumanizing in nature. 
Although I primarily rely on Arendt's description of the unforgivable as radical evil, it is 
worth examining a few other interpretations of the unforgivable. Charles Griswold 
believes that "no agent is absolutely and forever unforgivable."54 First, it is noteworthy 
that Griswold denies the possibility of the unforgivable for individuals, which coincides 
with my argument that only collective injuries are unforgivable. More importantly, his 
justification is that deeming someone unforgivable is to demonize her and view her as 
less than human. This is interesting because my discussion of the unforgivable had 
primarily focused on how the collective injuries dehumanize the victims, but not the 
offenders. The demonization of the offenders poses interesting questions about whether 
or not additional harms would be inflicted on the offenders. "For to respect [the 
offenders] qua human is to refuse to reduce them to their wrong-doing and to hold open 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 93. 
35 
'their capacity for reflection and transformation.'" Of course, the possible 
demonization is applicable to all instances of forgiveness, and such harms are 
incomparable to the dehumanization for the unforgivable collective injuries. That is, the 
concern of such demonization pales in comparison to the unforgivable injuries, especially 
because the victims would not be able to retaliate against their offenders in turn. Their 
suffering is unforgivable because they cannot reciprocate against their offenders. 
Although this paper is primarily focused on the victims' role in forgiveness, this is clearly 
an important concern for this discussion. Initially it appears that demonizing offenders 
could be, at least in part, the cause of the injuries being unforgivable. 
The notions of the unforgivable are furthered by Jacques Derrida, who argues that 
"forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable. One cannot, or should not, forgive; there is 
only forgiveness, if there is any, where there is the unforgivable."56 According to 
Derrida, the unforgivable are the highest examples of what forgiveness hopes to achieve, 
yet is inherently impossible. Derrida's inherent contradiction of forgiveness and the 
unforgivable is only worth noting to show the difficulties amongst the different 
interpretations of collective injuries, because it illustrates the complications of such 
discussions. Continuing with our topic, it is important to note the role of agency in the 
unforgivable. In order to forgive, an individual agent must forswear revenge. For 
example, a survivor of the Holocaust may forgive the Nazis to cope with the memory of 
her sufferings. And yet, the Holocaust is undoubtedly an absolute and radical evil that is 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 93. 
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unforgivable, because it cannot be punished, let alone by an individual. Such an 
individual agent lacks the moral authority to forgive on behalf of all survivors. 
If the unforgivable involves collectives, then there is the difficulty of constructing 
an adequate notion of collective agency to allow for collective forgiveness. More 
importantly, however, is that the unforgivable, as radical evil undermines the very 
possibility for agency. For example, Kant's use of radical evil presupposed human will 
and that there are comprehensible motives that can explain radical evil. But this is 
precisely what Arendt is calling into question: "we actually have nothing to fall back on 
in order to understand a phenomenon that nevertheless confronts us with its 
overpowering reality.'"58 Arendt understands radical evil as the attack against humanity, 
which in turns undermines morality. An attack on humanity and morality cannot be 
countered with the humanist morality of forgiveness, because these are the very features 
being destroyed by radical evil. Radical evil represents the unforgivable, because of its 
superfluousness: "To make human beings superfluous is to eradicate the very conditions 
that make humanity possible: ... Mass murder, genocide, unbearable large-scale suffering 
by innocent people, systematic torture and terror."59 Radical evil necessarily deals with 
collectives, so there is collective unforgivable. 
Similar to forgiveness, the unforgivable requires resentment. However, such 
resentment is not a necessary condition, as it is in forgiveness. Instead, resentment is an 
unavoidable result of the collectively unforgivable injuries: 
57
 Indeed, it was the incomprehensible nature of the Nazis and the Holocaust that first prompted Arendt 
adopt the notion of "radical evil." See Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, 139. 
Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, 143. 
59
 Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, 144. 
37 
If the offenders are not forgivable, [then] the injured should let go of as much 
anger as possible for other reasons, including peace of mind. Nonetheless it 
would be true that a person who is in principle unforgivable warrants resentment 
forever. Similarly, it would also be a mistake to hold that, given the frequency 
with which humans have treated each other cruelly and brutally, the thesis that 
such behavior is unforgivable 'offers a blueprint for lasting hatred ongoing 
conflict, and sagas of revenge.'60 
The unforgivable does not serve a purpose, since it does not strive for any particular ends, 
although care must be taken, because of the propensity for the unforgivable to be 
dehumanizing. Furthermore, "the magnitude of the wrong done generates doubt that 
anything could ever 'make up for' a truly atrocious wrong whose effects on you are 
permanent. The doubts are not dispelled by the argument that acknowledgement of our 
humanity is sufficient reason for forgiveness." ' Radical evil undermines the agency and 
humanity of its victims, and thus the shared humanity of the victimized and offending 
collectives is not sufficient for forgiveness. 
Radical evil and the unforgivable dehumanize its victims, but the victims must 
still be capable of resentment: "The issue of 'unforgivability' arises with respect to levels 
of evil that elicit resentment so deep as to be accompanied by rage; indeed outrage."62 
Similar to the forms of forgiveness previously discussed, resentment remains consistent 
in the unforgivable. The resentment cannot dissipate, because forgiveness can never be 
achieved. If anything, the presence of resentment is a necessary condition for the 
unforgivable. 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 92-3. 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 94. 
Griswold, Forgiveness, 91. 
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But if resentment is a necessary condition for the unforgivable, then African 
Americans would be required to be resentful for the unforgivable history of slavery and 
discrimination. However, they have not sought retaliation on the same scale of the 
injustices they have suffered, and are not nearly as resentful as such a requirement would 
seem to necessitate. But this does not mean that they have forgiven themselves, the 
European slave traders, American slave owners, and nearly everyone else that has been in 
some way culpable for their sufferings. The crimes are unforgiven, but only because they 
are quantifiably unforgivable. But even here there is the problem that the unforgiven 
implies the possibility of forgiveness, whereas the unforgivable excludes such 
possibilities. The legacy of American segregation and discrimination could be 
interpreted as unforgivable, because of the collective nature of the crimes, and the 
difficulty of achieving an appropriate forgiveness for such collective injuries. 
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CONCLUSION 
My discussion has been admittedly brief, and does not presuppose to offer an 
encompassing account of forgiveness. However, the definitions of forgiveness that I 
have laid out can be transferred from individuals to collectives. The inherent difficulties 
of collective forgiveness often result in the crimes remaining unforgiven, but this does 
not constitute the unforgivable. To understand the unforgivable, I have distinguished 
offenses from the offenders. Although it would be a mistake to interpret all crimes as 
unforgivable, just as all offenders are not immune to unforgivability, the agent must be 
separate from her actions. Collectives, on the other hand, may be defined as a group 
because of their collective acts, and thus be inseparably tied to their unforgivable crimes. 
While some individuals within such unforgivable collectives may be forgiven in spite of 
the associations with the group, figureheads of the group are likewise inseparable from 
the collective and its crimes. Although the distinction between an agent and its deeds 
may seem unintuitive, it is equally unsettling to think of the collective injuries cataloged 
by Tutu in the introductory quotation as forgivable. Indeed, such atrocities demand that 
they are unforgivable. Although my arguments may not be the most eloquent, I hope to 
have provided an understanding of forgiveness that allows for such crimes to remain 
beyond the possibility of forgiveness. 
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